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CHEVRON INSIDE THE REGULATORY STATE:
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Christopher J. Walker*
INTRODUCTION
For three decades, scholars (as well as courts and litigants) have written
thousands of articles (and opinions and briefs) concerning the impact of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.1 on judicial
review of agency statutory interpretation. This should come as no surprise
as Chevron is the most cited administrative law decision of all time.2 Little
attention, however, has been paid to how Chevron and its progeny have
actually shaped statutory interpretation inside the regulatory state.3 Indeed,
as Jerry Mashaw observed nearly a decade ago, ―virtually no one has even
asked, much less answered, some simple questions about agency statutory
interpretation.‖4 Professor Mashaw concluded with a call for more
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law.
Many thanks to Professors Nick Bagley, Kent Barnett, Jim Brudney, Ruth Colker, Tino
Cuellar, Emily Hammond, Kristin Hickman, Jud Mathews, Deborah Merritt, Aaron Nielson,
Guy Rub, Miriam Seifter, Peter Shane, and Peter Swire; to participants at the Big Ten Junior
Faculty Conference and Fordham Law Review symposium Chevron at 30: Looking Back
and Looking Forward; and, of course, to Professors Lisa Bressman and Abbe Gluck who
shared their survey, methodology, and experiences from a similar project on congressional
drafting. Thanks also to Professor Chris Holloman of The Ohio State University‘s Statistical
Consulting Service for technical support; to Chris Larocco, James Mee, and Justin Nelson as
well as Moritz librarian Matt Cooper for research assistance; and to the Center for
Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at The Ohio State University for funding. The
author‘s utmost thanks go to the agency general counsels, deputies, and assistants who spent
countless hours assisting with the empirical study and the 128 agency rule drafters who took
the time to respond to the 195-question survey.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking
Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 & n.2 (2014) (reporting citation
counts for U.S. Supreme Court administrative law decisions).
3. Two contributors to this symposium explore other aspects of the role of Chevron
inside the regulatory state. See Emily Hammond, Chevron’s Generality Principles, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 655 (2014) (exploring the effect of Chevron on agency behavior in rarely
reviewed types of agency actions); Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of Law,
and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679 (2014)
(exploring the President‘s role in Chevron‘s deference regime). Another contribution, by
contrast, provides a unique perspective on the impact—or, better said, lack thereof—of
Chevron on state administrative law. See Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State
Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (2014).
4. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary
Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (2005); see
also id. at 502 n.2 (reviewing literature).
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―[i]nquiry into the empirical realities of agency interpretive practice [to]
provide a crucial window on these issues and an essential step in the
assessment of the legitimacy of administrative governance.‖5
As part of the Fordham Law Review symposium Chevron at 30: Looking
Back and Looking Forward, this Essay answers Professor Mashaw‘s call to
action and presents the findings of the first comprehensive empirical
investigation into the effect of Chevron and related doctrines on how
federal agencies interpret statutes they administer.6 The Essay draws on a
larger, 195-question survey of federal agency rule drafters that covered a
variety of topics related to agency statutory interpretation.7 The survey was
modeled on Lisa Schultz Bressman and Abbe Gluck‘s pioneering study on
congressional drafting,8 which Professor Gluck‘s contribution to this
symposium further explores.9 The author administered the survey during a
five-month period at seven executive departments (Agriculture, Commerce,
Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Housing and
Urban Development, and Transportation) and two independent agencies
(Federal Communications Commission and Federal Reserve). Responses
were received from 128 agency officials whose primary duties included
statutory interpretation and rulemaking (for a 31 percent response rate).
Although concerns for confidentiality and deliberative process privilege
imposed methodological limitations on the survey—including anonymity as
to the individual respondent and the respondent‘s respective agency—the
study‘s findings provide a crucial window into Chevron‘s influence on
agency interpretive practices.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
deference doctrines and the empirical study. Part I.A introduces the main
deference doctrines and the theoretical work to date on how those doctrines
may affect interpretive practices inside the regulatory state. This part
focuses on Jud Mathews‘s deference lottery theory, which proposes that the
5. Id. at 537.
6. For an overview of the symposium, see Shane & Walker, supra note 2.
7. The full findings from the empirical study are reported elsewhere. See Christopher J.
Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter
Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2501716 . The
survey consisted of thirty-five main questions, with twenty-three questions containing three
to thirty-three subquestions. In this Essay, those questions (and relevant subquestions) are
cited. The survey is attached as an appendix to Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra,
and is available separately online. See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation:
Survey Appendix (Aug. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Walker, Survey Appendix],
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2481631.
8. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Part I]; Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014)
[hereinafter Bressman & Gluck, Part II]. Thanks again to Professors Bressman and Gluck
for sharing their survey, methodology, and experiences from this congressional drafting
study.
9. Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory
Interpretation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607 (2014).

2014]

CHEVRON INSIDE THE REGULATORY STATE

705

deference framework in administrative law be viewed through the gametheory lens of a lottery.10 This framework sheds considerable light on how
varying standards of review may affect agency interpretive practices. Part
I.A also discusses recent congressional efforts to instruct courts to apply
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.11 instead of Chevron on certain issues—a
legislative invention Kent Barnett has coined ―Chevmore codification‖ in
his contribution to this symposium and elsewhere.12
The Chevmore codification and deference lottery theories both rest on
empirical assumptions that federal agencies actually know and use these
judicial deference doctrines when drafting regulations and that the agencies
would draft regulations differently depending on which standard applied.
In other words, if they knew the more deferential Chevron standard
applied—as opposed to the Skidmore or de novo standards—the agencies
would advance more aggressive statutory interpretations, and vice versa.
Part I.B outlines the survey methodology to test these empirical
assumptions and introduces the 128 agency rule drafters who responded to
the survey. Parts II and III report the findings as to these two sets of
empirical assumptions, respectively.
As discussed in Part II, the agency rule drafters surveyed were well
aware of Chevron (at 94 percent) and Skidmore (at 81 percent), and
indicated that Chevron (at 90 percent) and Skidmore (at 63 percent) played
a role in their rule-drafting decisions. Although United States v. Mead
Corp.,13 another case crucial in the analysis, was not as well known by
name (at 61 percent), the rule drafters confirmed that they understood the
basic principles articulated in Mead—i.e., congressional authorization of
rulemaking or formal adjudication (at 84 percent) and the agency‘s use of it
(at 80 percent) affect whether an agency‘s interpretation receives Chevron
deference. The rule drafters also reported that the Chevron presumption of
delegation may have exceptions for certain types of ambiguities—some of
which are consistent with existing judicial precedent and some not. For
instance, fewer than half believed that Congress intends to delegate by
ambiguity major policy questions (at 32 to 56 percent, depending on
phrasing), preemption of state law (at 46 percent), or serious constitutional
questions (at 24 percent).
As for the second set of empirical assumptions, the findings discussed in
Part III reveal that the vast majority of rule drafters surveyed agreed or
strongly agreed that they think about judicial review when drafting statutes
(at 87 percent) and that their chances in court are better under Chevron than
10. Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2013); see also
Christopher J. Walker, How to Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. 73 (2013)
(responding to Mathews, supra). Indeed, Professor Mathews‘s framework played an
important role in the development of the main part of the study presented in this Essay.
11. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
12. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
[hereinafter Barnett, Codifying Chevmore], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2405016;
Kent Barnett, Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise within Chevmore Codification, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 587 (2014) [hereinafter Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore].
13. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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Skidmore or no deference (at 83 percent). Moreover, four in ten (38 to 43
percent) agreed or strongly agreed that federal agencies are more aggressive
in their interpretive efforts if they know Chevron deference applies; another
four in ten (40 to 45 percent) somewhat agreed. Part III then briefly
explores the rule drafters‘ knowledge and use of various doctrines other
than the deference standards that could affect how aggressive agencies are
in their interpretive efforts.
This Essay provides a new and important window into the role of
Chevron and its progeny inside the regulatory state. Based on the findings
presented in this Essay, it would not be an understatement to conclude that
thirty years of Chevron have saturated the federal agency rulemaking
process. The rule drafters surveyed overwhelmingly indicated familiarity
with and use of these doctrines in their statutory interpretation efforts, and
many also indicated that federal agencies are more aggressive in their
interpretive efforts if they are confident their interpretations will receive
Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore or no deference at all).
I. OVERVIEW
To understand why Chevron and related doctrines may affect how federal
agencies interpret statutes, one must first understand the current state of
judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. Part I.A briefly presents
the two dueling deference standards in a post-Chevron, post-Mead world,
along with the empirical and theoretical work undertaken to date. Part I.B
presents the survey methodology and the background on the 128 agency
rule drafters who responded to the survey.
A. The Doctrine: Dueling Deference Standards
Administrative law today recognizes two main doctrines with respect to
judicial review of agency statutory interpretations: Chevron and Skidmore.
The first is the familiar, thirty-year-old Chevron two-step approach we
commemorate with this symposium. Under Chevron, a reviewing court
must defer to an agency‘s interpretation of a statute it administers if the
court finds, at Step One, that ―the statute is silent or ambiguous‖ and then,
at Step Two, that the agency‘s reading is a ―permissible construction of the
statute.‖14 The court ―need not conclude that the agency construction was
the only one it permissibly could have adopted . . . or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding.‖15
The second is the much-older Skidmore standard, which, as Peter Strauss
reminds us in his contribution, also celebrates its seventieth birthday this
year.16 Unlike under Chevron where an agency‘s reasonable interpretation
14. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
15. Id. at 843 n.11.
16. Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 789 (2014). As
Professor Strauss notes, Chevron arguably just ―universalized‖ a standard articulated in the
same year as Skidmore in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). Strauss,
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of an ambiguous statute controls, Skidmore instructs the reviewing court to
give the agency‘s interpretation ―weight‖ based on ―the thoroughness
evident in [the agency‘s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade.‖17
Courts and commentators often call Skidmore and Chevron ―deference‖
doctrines, but reference to deference can obscure what is at stake in
deciding which doctrine should apply to an agency‘s statutory
interpretation. To capture the difference, Professor Strauss helpfully
reframes these doctrines as ―Chevron space‖ and ―Skidmore weight.‖18 An
agency receives Chevron space to fill in holes in statutes it administers
because Congress empowered the agency to be ―the authoritative interpreter
(within the limits of reason) of such statutes.‖19 Or, as Professor Strauss
puts it, ―the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match, is
to see that the ball stays within the bounds of the playing field and that the
game is played according to its rules. It is not for courts themselves to play
the game.‖20 That is not the case with Skidmore weight, where Congress
has not delegated space for agencies to be authoritative interpreters.
Instead, Skidmore weight ―addresses the possibility that an agency‘s view
on a given statutory question may in itself warrant respect by judges who
themselves have ultimate interpretive authority.‖21
So even when it has no Chevron space, the agency retains the power to
persuade based on its special expertise in statutory interpretation. Agencies
often have comparative expertise based on their nationwide implementation
of the statute and their involvement in drafting the statute.22 In sum, when
framed in terms of Chevron space and Skidmore weight, it becomes clear
what is at stake when an agency requests Chevron space:
supra, at 791–92; accord Thomas Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an
Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398 (Peter Strauss ed., 2006).
17. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
18. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space”
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144–45 (2012); see also Mead, 533
U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that Chevron ―create[s] a space, so to speak,
for the exercise of continuing agency discretion‖); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (describing
standard as ―weight‖ based on ―power to persuade‖).
19. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983
(2005). The author has explored elsewhere how Chevron and related doctrines are motivated
by constitutional separation of powers values. See Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding
Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X
Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 173–82 (2012) [hereinafter
Walker, Brand X Constitutional Avoidance]; Walker, supra note 10, at 78; Christopher J.
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242869.
20. Strauss, supra note 18, at 1145.
21. Id.
22. See id. Indeed, the agency rule drafters surveyed indicated their agencies play a
substantial role in both the technical and the substantive drafting of statutes and even some
role in the drafting of legislative history. See Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra
note 7, at 34–36 & fig.6 (reporting survey findings on agencies‘ role in the legislative
process).
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Win, and the agency becomes the authoritative interpreter (within the
bounds of reason) of the statutory ambiguity. Lose, and the agency is
relegated to the role of an expert witness that must rely on its powers to
persuade the court to adopt the agency‘s preferred reading of the
ambiguous statute.23

The lack of Chevron space may result from either of the following:
(1) Congress has not delegated interpretive authority to the agency; or
(2) the agency has ―cho[sen] not to exercise that authority, but rather to
guide—to indicate desired directions without undertaking (as [it] might) to
compel them.‖24 The clearest evidence of such delegation is statutory
authority for rulemaking or formal adjudication (and the agency‘s use of it).
This was the basic takeaway from Mead: ―a very good indicator of
delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional
authorizations to engage in the rulemaking or adjudication process that
produces the regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.‖25 In
City of Arlington v. FCC,26 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that it is not
just ―a very good indicator‖ but a dispositive one.27 But the Mead Court
noted it had ―sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when
no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.‖28
Shortly after Mead was decided, Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman
labeled the Mead question about when Chevron space or Skidmore weight
should apply as ―Chevron step zero.‖29 Mead has since received extensive
scholarly (and judicial) attention. Indeed, in their separate contributions to
this symposium, Professors Hickman and Merrill are joined by Jack
Beermann and Peter Strauss in chronicling that literature as well as debating
the future of Chevron Step Zero after City of Arlington.30 Moreover, James
Brudney‘s contribution relies on a dataset of 730 Supreme Court decisions
to evaluate the use of Chevron and Skidmore in the workplace law
context.31 And Miriam Seifter‘s contribution rejects the call for a
federalism exception at Chevron Step Zero.32 Accordingly, the substantial
literature on Mead will not be further reviewed here.
23. Walker, supra note 10, at 79.
24. Strauss, supra note 18, at 1146.
25. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
26. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
27. Id. at 1874 (holding that ―the preconditions to deference under Chevron are satisfied
because Congress has unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer
the Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation
at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority‖).
28. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. The Mead Court also confirmed that Skidmore weight
applies when Chevron deference does not. See id. at 234–38 (reviewing Skidmore factors).
29. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
836–37 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–11 (2006).
30. See Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These
Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 741–43 (2014); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of
Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 528–30 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City
of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 756–58 (2014); Strauss, supra note 16.
31. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498 (2014).
32. Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2014).
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The literature to date, however, has not explored empirically how
Chevron, Mead, or Skidmore may affect statutory interpretation inside the
regulatory state. And these questions are almost as equally undertheorized.
As for theory, Jud Mathews‘s deference lottery framework is the main
contribution. He explains that the interaction between Chevron space and
Skidmore weight can be viewed as a ―lottery‖ as that term is used in
expected utility theory33—indeed, a compound lottery ―whose prizes are
other lotteries.‖34 Agencies face a two-stage lottery when they adopt a
statutory interpretation. The first is whether the court will review the
interpretation for Chevron space or Skidmore weight. The second is
whether the court will uphold the agency‘s interpretation under the
deference standard selected in the first stage.35
The lottery‘s first stage arises from Mead‘s failure to provide clear
guidance on when reviewing courts should apply Chevron space or
Skidmore weight.36
Courts and commentators have bemoaned the
uncertainty Mead introduced to administrative law.37 And, as Professor
Mathews has chronicled,38 the empirical studies to date have confirmed the
existence of a deference lottery after Mead—with the leading studies on the
Supreme Court jurisprudence by Bill Eskridge, Lauren Baer, and Connor
Raso39 and the leading study on the courts of appeals by Kristin Hickman

33. Mathews, supra note 10, at 1352; see also Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference
Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416516 (modeling how deference regimes may
push agency statutory interpretation in a pro-regulated-entity direction).
34. F.J. Anscombe & R.J. Aumann, A Definition of Subjective Probability, 34 ANNALS
MATHEMATICAL STAT. 199, 200 (1963) (defining compound lottery).
35. Mathews, supra note 10, at 1353; see also Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 31 (1998) (finding agencies win 89 percent at Chevron Step Two).
36. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001).
37. See id. at 239–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the confusion Mead causes for
courts in deciding whether Chevron applies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts,
Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 480
(2002) (asserting that Mead ―provides little guidance to lower courts, agencies, and regulated
parties about how to discern congressional intent in any given set of circumstances‖);
Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and MetaStandards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 813 (2002) (describing Mead as ―an undefined standard
that invites consideration of a number of variables of indefinite weight‖); Adrian Vermeule,
Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 361 (2003) (arguing that
Mead ―inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-man‘s land‖).
38. See Mathews, supra note 10, at 1362–72. Richard Pierce has similarly reviewed the
existing empirical work, concluding that ―the studies suggest that a court‘s choice of which
doctrine to apply in reviewing an agency action is not an important determinant of outcomes
in the Supreme Court or the circuit courts.‖ Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of
Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011).
39. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon,
Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference
Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010); see also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To
the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J.
984.
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and Matthew Krueger.40 However, City of Arlington may have alleviated
much of the uncertainty about whether Chevron or Skidmore applies in a
given context by definitively declaring that Chevron always applies when
Congress vests an agency with rulemaking or formal adjudication authority
and the agency uses that authority to promulgate its interpretation.41
Regardless whether there is enough Chevron Step Zero uncertainty to
make the first stage a meaningful lottery, viewing the deference regime
through the lottery framework can help us think critically about how
varying standards of review may affect agency behavior and how courts (or
Congress) can modify the standards to influence agency behavior. For
instance, Professor Mathews argues that having some uncertainty about
which standard applies—as opposed to always applying Chevron—actually
―offers a more flexible tool for shaping agency behavior‖ because ―[a]
deference lottery can encourage a rational agency to choose an
interpretation that lies somewhere between the safest and the most
adventurous version that the agency can hope to get away with.‖42 For
instance, Professor Mathews argues, ―paradoxically, increasing the scrutiny
an agency will receive under Skidmore can actually encourage an agency to
adopt a less faithful interpretation of the statute.‖43 That is because if
Skidmore is difficult to satisfy, ―the expected benefit is higher from
selecting an interpretation the agency prefers and ‗betting it all‘ on the
Chevron lottery.‖44 Moreover, if Skidmore were too easy on the agency,
the agency would have less incentive to adopt a more faithful statutory
interpretation because it would almost always win the second-stage
deference lottery. Simultaneously tightening the Skidmore and Chevron
lotteries to make it harder for the agency to win may be just as effective at
encouraging more faithful interpretation.45
The deference lottery is not just a game for courts and agencies to play.
Although not explored by Professor Mathews, Congress could also
intervene to change one or both of these lotteries. Indeed, as Professor
Barnett notes in his contribution to this symposium, Congress has actually
done that in at least one instance. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act,46 Congress directed courts to review for
Skidmore weight any decision to preempt state law made by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).47 Like Professor Mathews,
40. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2007); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has
Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443 (2005).
41. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013); accord Seifter, supra note
32, at 640.
42. Mathews, supra note 10, at 1354.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1354–55.
45. See id. at 1386–87.
46. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
47. Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 12, at 587; see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 25b(b)(5)(A) (2012) (―A court reviewing any determinations made by the Comptroller
regarding preemption of a State law . . . shall assess the validity of such determinations,
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Professor Barnett goes on to theorize how this change in the deference
lottery should affect agency behavior, asserting that Chevmore codification
can encourage the agency to, among other things, develop more expertise
and engage in more public participation.48 Congressional modification of
the deference regime would likely have a greater impact on agency decision
making than just a judicial modification as the congressional directive
would be reinforced by the courts on judicial review.49
Until now, however, whether judicial or legislative tinkering with the
deference standard would actually affect agency behavior seemed plausible
in theory but unknown in fact. There are at least two sets of untested
empirical assumptions: (1) whether federal agencies know and consider
these deference doctrines when interpreting statutes; and (2) whether
federal agencies interpret statutes differently if they know their
interpretation will receive Chevron space or Skidmore weight.50 Parts II
and III of this Essay, respectively, attempt to shed some empirical light on
these questions. First, however, Part I.B explains the underlying study‘s
methodology.
B. The Empirical Study: Methodology and Background
The findings reported in this Essay are drawn from a larger empirical
study on agency statutory interpretation.51
As mentioned in the
Introduction, that study was modeled on the 171-question survey conducted
by Professors Bressman and Gluck on congressional drafting.52 Most of the
questions relevant to this Essay, however, were not included in the
Bressman and Gluck study. Indeed, nearly half (97 of 195) of the questions
in this study dealt with administrative law doctrines, whereas the Bressman
and Gluck study included forty-five questions on those topics.53
Similarly, their methodology had to be adapted to the federal agency
context where the pool of potential respondents is spread across hundreds of
depending upon the thoroughness evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of
the reasoning of the agency, the consistency with other valid determinations made by the
agency, and other factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision.‖).
48. See Barnett, Preemption and Chevmore, supra note 12, at 605.
49. See id. at 605–06.
50. A third and related set of assumptions concerns whether the standard of review
significantly affects the likelihood of agency success in court. Professor Barnett has noted
this elsewhere—reviewing the studies to date that suggest the standard does not matter—and
concluded that if the studies are correct, the ―so-called Skidmore penalties and Chevron
rewards lose some force.‖ Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, supra note 12, at 63. Those
empirical assumptions lie outside the scope of this study, but for purposes of understanding
the effect of Chevmore codification, they also may not shed too much light. As Professor
Barnett has noted, the more important question is whether federal agencies‘ interpretive
practices differ when Chevron or Skidmore applies: ―Therefore, even if it is only a myth that
Chevron and Skidmore lead to different results [in court], that myth [if believed by the
federal agencies] has purchase on agencies and Congress.‖ Id. at 65.
51. This part presents an abbreviated version of the study‘s methodology set forth in
greater detail in Part I of Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7. When
possible, please refer and cite to the longer version of the methodology description.
52. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 919–24.
53. Id. at 992.
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federal agencies and offices, and adequate access to that pool would require
official approval from the agency and not just the individual respondent.
Accordingly, over the span of nine months, the author reached out to
officials at every executive department, over eighty agencies and offices
within those departments, and a dozen or so independent agencies.
Ultimately, various agencies and offices at seven executive departments and
two independent agencies agreed to participate.54 As a condition for
participation, the agencies required that the survey be anonymous as to both
the respondent and the respondent‘s agency and that it be conducted online
as opposed to the in-person approach of the Bressman and Gluck study.
The online survey consisted of thirty-five questions, many of which had
multiple subquestions for a total of 195 questions.55 The agency point
54. Some departments limited the survey population to particular agencies or offices, but
within those populations the survey was sent to all officials identified as having experience
in statutory interpretation and rulemaking. A total of forty-one offices, agencies, and
divisions were included in the survey, with the breakdown by department and independent
agency as follows (total population sent the survey in parentheses):
 U.S. Department of Agriculture (55): Office of General Counsel and eighteen USDA
agencies and offices (e.g., the Food Safety and Inspection Service, the Forest Service,
and the Office of Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis);
 U.S. Department of Commerce (13): Office of General Counsel, Commerce Bureau
of Industry and Security, and the U.S. Patent and Trade Office;
 U.S. Department of Energy (eighteen): Office of General Counsel;
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (55): Office of General Counsel, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Coast Guard;
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (146):
Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the Public Health Division;
 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (10): Office of General
Counsel;
 U.S. Department of Transportation (81): Office of the Secretary, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Pipeline and Hazardous
Material Safety Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Federal Highway Administration;
 Federal Communications Commission (16): Office of General Counsel; and
 Federal Reserve (17): Legal Division. Unlike the other agencies surveyed, to reduce
the workload on the Legal Division, the Federal Reserve only sent the survey to a
seventeen-person subset of potential rule drafters—though the point-of-contact chose
that subset based on which agency officials are most engaged in rule drafting on a
regular basis.
55. Walker, Survey Appendix, supra note 7. Because many of the questions build on
prior questions and in light of concerns about incomplete surveys, see infra note 58, the
thirty-five main questions were asked in chronological order; subquestions were randomized
within each main question to minimize response-order effects. See, e.g., Jon A. Krosnick &
Duane F. Alwin, An Evaluation of a Cognitive Theory of Response-Order Effects in Survey
Measurement, 51 PUB. OP. Q. 201, 201–19 (1987); William S. Sekely & Vicki L. Blakney,
The Effect of Response Position on Trade Magazine Readership and Usage, 34 J. AD. RES.
53, 53–59 (1994). There are methodological costs to not fully randomizing the survey in
that the order may affect the answers, though such effects are typically more of an issue with
attitudinal studies (which this is not). See generally HOWARD SCHUMANN & STANLEY
PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATTITUDE SURVEYS: EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION
FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT (1981). Moreover, Professors Bressman and Gluck found
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persons sent the survey via email to the populations of agency officials
identified as having experience in statutory interpretation and rulemaking,
encouraging but not requiring them to respond.56 In total, 411 such agency
officials received the survey, and 128 agency officials responded for a 31
percent response rate.57 Of the respondents, ninety-eight (77 percent)
answered each and every question.58 The survey also allowed the
respondents to make additional comments on most questions; the data set
includes 345 such comments, including sixty-nine comments in response to
the administrative law questions.
So who are these agency rule drafters that responded to the survey? All
are career civil servants as opposed to political appointees.59 And all but
eleven are lawyers.60 Nearly two-thirds have worked at a federal agency in
a capacity that includes some rulemaking work for at least five years.61
no response-order effects when they scrambled the questions in their related congressional
drafting survey. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside: Methods Appendix, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 12 & n.45 (2013), available at
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/statutory-interpretation-inside-methodsappendix. To help the reader account for any response-order effects, the Essay references
the relevant question number being discussed—abbreviated as ―Q_‖—with the survey
reproduced as Walker, Survey Appendix, supra note 7.
56. The surveying phase took place over the course of five months at the various
agencies; the agency contacts followed up with the populations via email roughly two weeks
after the initial invitation and then a final reminder about two weeks after that. Of the 128
respondents, only one answered ―no‖ to the first question about whether the respondent is
―currently working, or [has] worked within the last two years, in a general counsel office,
legal department, or other rulemaking office in a federal agency AND that [the respondent]
had experience in statutory interpretation and rulemaking in that employment,‖ and thus did
not respond to the survey beyond the background questions.
57. The anonymous nature of the survey limits the ability to calculate a response rate by
agency or department. However, because the survey was rolled out at different times at each
agency, the data collected confirm that at least some individuals in all of the population
pools responded (as opposed to being predominated by one department or independent
agency). That said, there is no way to assess with precision whether the response rate differs
across the agencies contacted. As a result, it is possible that nonresponse bias is strong
within a single agency due to cultural or other factors. Moreover, the FDA requested that its
rule drafters have the option to indicate that they work at the FDA, so the first question was
modified to allow for the respondents to voluntarily so indicate. Of the 128 responses,
twenty indicated that they worked at the FDA. The size of the FDA rule-drafter population
that received the survey was seventy, so assuming all FDA respondents self-identified the
FDA response rate was 27 percent, which is in line with the overall 31 percent response rate.
58. The answers from respondents who did not fully complete the survey are included in
the findings. A sizeable number of respondents (thirty) provided only partial responses.
This rate might indicate the survey was intimidating to individuals who did not possess a
strong grasp of the concepts being discussed, resulting in undersampling of less
knowledgeable individuals at the agencies. Another plausible explanation is that some
respondents tired of the 195-question survey, as there does not appear to be any pattern about
when respondents stopped answering questions. Because the main thirty-five questions were
not randomized (though the subquestions were), supra note 55, the undersampling can be
taken into account and the total number of respondents ―(n=__)‖ will be included for each
question—abbreviated as ―Q__ (n=__)‖.
59. Q2 (n=128). As discussed in notes 55 and 58 supra, ―Q__‖ refers to the question
number in Walker, Survey Appendix, supra note 7, and ―n=__‖ refers to the number of rule
drafters who answered that question. The data set is on file with the author.
60. Q6 (n=126).
61. Q3 (n=128).

714

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

About four in ten have had a role in the drafting process of at least a dozen
rules, with another 15 percent in the seven to eleven range, 25 percent in the
three to six range, and the rest (16 percent) in the zero to two range. 62 One
respondent, for instance, indicated involvement in ―over 500 rulemaking
actions‖; another indicated that ―[j]ust in the past 7 years, it has been 80
rules between proposed rules, interim rules, and final rules‖; and a third
said they were ―too numerous to count.‖63 Moreover, 38 percent are over
the age of forty-five, 51 percent are between thirty-one and forty-five, and
the remaining 11 percent are between twenty-two and thirty.64 Four in ten
(42 percent) respondents took a course in law school on legislation,
statutory interpretation, or statutory drafting, whereas half (49 percent) did
not.65 Only one in four respondents have taken such a course other than in
law school—many via continuing legal education or government training
programs.66
Before turning to the findings in Parts II and III, it is important to
underscore that, as with any survey that attempts to understand human
behavior, caution should be taken so as to avoid reading too much into the
rule drafters‘ responses. Despite the fact that all rule drafters at these
agencies were sent the survey, not every executive department, much less
every federal agency, agreed to participate. So the generalizability of the
survey findings is limited by whether the surveyed agencies constitute a fair
representation of the administrative state overall.67 Indeed, because of the
methodological limitations imposed by the participating agencies—
including the anonymous nature of the survey and a limited sampling of
agencies68—the Essay errs on the side of caution and presents a descriptive

62. Q4 (n=128).
63. Q4, cmts. 3, 10, 11. The specific comments are numbered in the data set. For ease of
reference, those numbers are cited herein.
64. Q5 (n=126).
65. Q6 (n=126); Q7 (n=126). The survey also asked what year the respondent graduated
from law school (Q6), and such results are similar to the age ranges. Id. Although outside
the ambitions of this Essay, it would be interesting to compare whether when one graduated
from law school affects one‘s views on Chevron and related doctrines.
66. Q8 (n=126).
67. See generally FLOYD J. FOWLER, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS (5th ed. 2014)
(discussing the broad scope of biases that need to be considered).
68. These, of course, are not the only methodological limitations. For instance, there is
always the possibility of social desirability bias. Respondents might feel that they should
indicate greater familiarity with the interpretive tools (and greater use of them) than they
actually possess (and do), since they might view it as the most appropriate way to conduct
their jobs. The tendency to modify answers in this way arises from two sources, termed
―self-deception‖ and ―other-deception.‖ See generally H.A. Sackeim & R.C. Gur, SelfDeception, Self-Confrontation, and Consciousness, in 2 CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELFREGULATION: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 139 (G.I. Schwartz & R.D. eds., 1978).
In this study, attempts were made to minimize social desirability bias. As for otherdeception, the survey was completely anonymous and taken online outside the presence of
an interviewer. As for self-deception, the survey was designed to ask about the same
interpretive tools in different ways, by name and by principle. See Anton J. Nederhof,
Methods of Coping with Social Desirability Bias: A Review, 15 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 263
(1985). As discussed, supra notes 58–67, there may also be issues with selection bias,
incomplete surveys, nonrandomization of main questions order, and other biases that the
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picture of these particular 128 rule drafters. (The Bressman and Gluck
study took the same approach.69) That said, this study is the most extensive
inquiry into actual agency interpretive practices to date, and the raw
numbers shed considerable light on the influence of Chevron and related
doctrines on agency statutory interpretation.
II. LOOKING BACK: THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES
IN AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
As discussed in Part I.A, the deference lottery and Chevmore codification
theories both assume that agencies know about Chevron space and
Skidmore weight, that these standards play a role in agencies‘ drafting
decisions, that agencies think about judicial review when drafting statutes,
and that the agencies may interpret a statute differently based on which
standard applies. Part II reports the survey findings related to the former
two assumptions concerning doctrine familiarity and reported use in rule
drafting.70 Part III then presents the findings as to the latter two
assumptions about how Chevron and related doctrines may shape agency
interpretive behavior.
A. Awareness and Use by Name: Chevron the Big Winner
With respect to Chevron, Mead, Skidmore, and Auer/Seminole Rock,71
the rule drafters were asked whether they were familiar by name with these
―interpretive doctrines related to how much deference courts will accord
federal agency decisions‖ and whether ―these doctrines play a role in [their]
drafting decisions.‖72 Figure 1 depicts their responses to these questions.73

study has attempted to minimize but nonetheless cannot be completely controlled or
measured through the methodology utilized.
69. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 923.
70. The findings reported in Part II are discussed in greater detail—albeit with a
different focus—in Part IV of Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, whereas
the findings discussed in Part III have not been previously reported.
71. Auer/Seminole Rock deference instructs courts to give an agency‘s interpretation of
its own regulation ―controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.‖ Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); accord Auer
v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). This standard lies outside of the scope of the Essay
but is noted for comparison purposes. The agency rule drafters were also asked about
Curtiss-Wright deference, which is a ―super-strong deference to executive department
interpretations in matters of foreign affairs and national security.‖ Eskridge & Baer, supra
note 39, at 1100; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
Only 6 percent indicated any awareness of this doctrine by name, with 2 percent indicating
the doctrine played a role in their rule-drafting decisions. Q17(e) (n=109); Q18(e) (n=109).
72. Q17; Q18.
73. Q17(a)–(d) (n=109); Q18(a)–(d) (n=109).
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As Figure 1 illustrates, Chevron was the big winner at 94 percent
awareness, followed by Skidmore at 81 percent, Mead at 61 percent, and
Auer/Seminole Rock at 53 percent.74 The results were similar for their
reported use in rule drafting, though reported use was less than awareness:
Chevron at 90 percent, Skidmore at 62 percent, Mead at 49 percent, and
Auer/Seminole Rock at 39 percent.75 About one in ten (11 percent) rule
drafters, however, indicated that none of these doctrines played a role in
their drafting decisions.76
Indeed, Chevron was the clear winner of the entire study. Among all
twenty-two interpretive tools tested in the survey, Chevron was the most
known by name (at 94 percent) and most reported as playing a role in rule
drafting (at 90 percent). The next most known tools were: the ordinary
meaning canon (at 92 percent); Skidmore (at 81 percent); and the
presumption against preemption of state law (at 78 percent).77 The tools
most reported after Chevron as playing a role in rule drafting were: the
whole act rule (presumption of consistent usage throughout statute) (at 89
percent); the ordinary meaning canon (at 87 percent); Mead (by concept) (at
80 percent); noscitur a sociis (associated-words canon) (at 79 percent); and
legislative history (at 76 percent).78
Moreover, without referring to Chevron by name, the rule drafters were
asked whether they agreed with the following Chevron restatement: ―If a
statute is ambiguous and the agency‘s construction is reasonable, a court
must accept the agency‘s construction of the statute, even if the agency‘s
reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory
interpretation.‖79 About four in five strongly agreed (46 percent) or agreed
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Q17(a)–(d) (n=109).
Q18(a)–(d) (n=109).
Q18(f) (n=109).
Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, at 18–20 & fig.1.
Id. at 18–20 & fig.2.
Q16(b).
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(38 percent), and another 11 percent agreed somewhat. Only 5 percent
disagreed at all, with one rule drafter indicating strong disagreement.80 In
sum, the overwhelming majority of rule drafters surveyed indicated that
they knew, used, and agreed with Chevron space and to a somewhat lesser
extent knew and used Skidmore weight when drafting rules.
B. Awareness by Concept: Mead the Big Winner
Although the rule drafters knew (61 percent) and used (49 percent) Mead
by name less than Chevron or Skidmore, Mead was a big winner when rule
drafters were asked about the underlying principles—i.e., that congressional
authorization for, and agency use of, rulemaking or formal adjudication are
strong indicia of congressional delegation to agencies.81 To measure Mead
awareness, the rule drafters were asked whether eight different factors
―affect whether Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or no
deference) applies to an agency‘s interpretation of an ambiguous statute it
administers.‖82 Table 1 presents their answers to this question.83
The leading factors the rule drafters reported to affect if Chevron applies
were the two Mead principles: whether Congress authorized the agency to
engage in rulemaking and/or formal adjudication (84 percent), and whether
the agency promulgated the interpretation via rulemaking and/or formal
adjudication (80 percent), followed by whether the agency has expertise
relevant to interpreting the statutory provisions at issue (79 percent).84
Fewer than half agreed with the other factors listed: the interpretation sets
forth the bounds of the agency‘s jurisdiction (46 percent), longstanding
nature of agency‘s interpretation (43 percent), its contemporaneous nature
(20 percent), its furtherance of uniform administration of law (18 percent),
and the agency‘s political accountability (9 percent).85

80. Q16(b) (n=104). Because this question asks about the rule drafters‘ agreement with
particular statements, those who indicated they did not know are not included in the number
of respondents or the percentage calculation. No doubt the following comment reflected the
strong dissenter‘s perspective: ―‗a court MUST ACCEPT the agency‘s interpretation‘? Uh,
no. Maybe they should, but after all, it is courts that review agency interpretations and not
the other way around.‖ Q16, cmt. 3.
81. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001).
82. Q19(a)–(h).
83. Q19(a)–(h) (n=92). Because this question asked the rule drafters about which
factors affect which deference regime applies, the number of respondents considered and
percentage calculation in Table 1 exclude the seventeen respondents who indicated they did
not know.
84. Q19(a)–(b), (d) (n=92).
85. Q19(e)–(h) (n=92).
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In other words, the Mead doctrine was one of the most understood among
the interpretive tools tested in this study. Only Chevron (at 90 percent), the
whole-act rule (at 89 percent), and the ordinary meaning canon (at 87
percent) were reported by more rule drafters as playing a role in their ruledrafting decisions.86 At first blush, one may conclude that these findings on
Mead support the deference lottery theory as they demonstrate the rule
drafters‘ prerequisite knowledge about the deference doctrines. But perhaps
the opposite is true after City of Arlington v. FCC.87 Because City of
Arlington appears to guarantee that Chevron applies if these two factors are
present88 and the rule drafters surveyed understood these two factors to be
most important, there is far less uncertainty in the first stage of the lottery.
There would no longer be a meaningful compound lottery, just a one-stage
lottery under Chevron (or Skidmore). To be sure, the survey population
here consists of rule drafters, not other types of agency officials who may
more often advance agency statutory interpretation through less formal
means not addressed by City of Arlington where the first-stage lottery
would still be meaningful. Moreover, as discussed in Part II.C, there
remains some uncertainty even here, as the rule drafters surveyed indicated
that not all ambiguities are created equal.
C. Scope of Delegation: Not All Ambiguities Are the Same
A somewhat related issue for determining the effect the deference lottery
(or Chevmore codification) may have on agency interpretive practices is
whether the agency rule drafters agree with the courts about which types of
ambiguities in statutes Congress intends for the agency to fill. After all, if
rule drafters understand which ambiguities are owed Chevron space,
Skidmore weight, or no deference at all, that could influence whether
modifying the deference standard would affect agency behavior. Similarly,
if rule drafters already believe certain ambiguities do not trigger Chevron
86. Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7, at 18–20 & fig.2.
87. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
88. Id. at 1874.
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deference, then congressional codification of Skidmore or no deference for
those ambiguities (think, e.g., preemption, serious constitutional questions,
or major policy questions) arguably would have no effect on agency
statutory interpretation.
To assess the rule drafters‘ understanding about which ambiguities signal
delegation, the survey asked about the ten types of ambiguities. Figure 2
presents the findings as to which kinds of ambiguities or gaps the agency
rule drafters believed that congressional drafters intend for the federal
agencies to fill.89

In light of general delegation principles articulated in Chevron and its
progeny, three of the top four ambiguities reported as signaling delegation
are not too surprising: ambiguities relating to the details of implementation
(at 99 percent), the agency‘s area of expertise (at 92 percent), and omissions
in the statute (72 percent).90 The only agency rule drafter to dissent on
implementation details chose ―none of the above,‖ indicating the view that
Congress did not intend for agencies to fill any of the types of ambiguities
listed.91

89. Q15(a)–(j) (n=111). Two respondents indicated they did not know, so the number of
respondents considered and percentage calculations in Figure 2 do not include those
responses. Another rule drafter indicated none of the above, so that response is included.
90. Q15(a)–(j) (n=111). Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) also indicated that Congress
intends to delegate by ambiguity the division between state and federal agencies when both
are given implementation roles. That finding has less relevance for this Essay, but it is
explored in Part IV.B of Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, supra note 7.
91. Q15(k) (n=111). Of the eighteen comments, five expressed concern that the
question could not be answered in a general matter but depended on the statute. Q15, cmts.
3, 4, 6, 11 & 13. Another criticized it as ―indulg[ing] the unsupportable fiction that
congressional drafters have a unified approach on these things. They don‘t.‖ Q15, cmt. 5.
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It is also not too surprising based on existing doctrine that the rule
drafters were less confident and more conflicted about whether Congress
intends to delegate major questions by ambiguity. The Court has carved out
an exception to the Chevron presumption of delegation in the form of the
major questions doctrine. Professors Bressman and Gluck nicely frame this
doctrine as ―a presumption of nondelegation in the face of statutory
ambiguity over major policy questions or questions of major political or
economic significance.‖92 The doctrine exists, as Justice Scalia creatively
put it, because it is presumed Congress ―does not . . . hide elephants in
mouseholes.‖93
The rule drafters were asked about ambiguities or gaps related to the
major questions in three ways, with the results as follows: ―major policy
questions‖ at 56 percent, ―questions of major economic significance‖ at 49
percent, and ―questions of major political significance‖ at 32 percent.94 In
other words, far fewer rule drafters indicated that Congress intends to
delegate ambiguities implicating major questions than those discussed
above concerning implementation details, agency expertise, and statutory
omissions. Yet despite Supreme Court guidance to the contrary, a majority
indicated that Congress does intend to delegate by ambiguity major policy
questions when framed as such—instead of as major economic or political
questions. So, there does seem to be some disconnect.
On the other hand, three in four (75 percent) rule drafters indicated that
Congress intends for agencies to fill gaps or ambiguities relating to the
agency‘s own jurisdiction or regulatory authority.95 And in the question
about which factors affect whether Chevron deference applies, nearly half
(46 percent) indicated that it matters ―[w]hether the agency‘s statutory
interpretation sets forth the bounds of the agency‘s jurisdiction or
regulatory authority.‖96 While such jurisdictional questions arguably could
be viewed as major policy questions,97 respondents‘ views are consistent
with City of Arlington, which held that ―an agency‘s interpretation of a
statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of its regulatory authority (that
is, its jurisdiction) is entitled to [Chevron] deference.‖98
By contrast, only about one in four (24 percent) rule drafters believed
that Congress intends for federal agencies to fill gaps implicating serious
constitutional questions.99 That was the clear loser for this question. And
92. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 1003.
93. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also Jacob Loshin
& Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010)
(reviewing literature and providing summary of doctrinal development).
94. Q15(b)–(d) (n=111).
95. Q15(f) (n=111).
96. Q19(c) (n=109). But that question did not ask in what way such factors would affect
how Chevron deference applies.
97. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 1005–06 (so noting); accord
Christopher J. Walker, Does Congress Really Mean to Delegate Interpretative Authority to
Agencies?, JOTWELL (Aug. 16, 2013), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/does-congress-reallymean-to-delegate-interpretative-authority-to-agencies/.
98. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013).
99. Q15(e) (n=111).
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that finding challenges at least this author‘s prior argument that agencies are
better positioned than courts to address constitutional questions in statutes
they administer in the first instance; thus, perhaps the empirical realities of
agency statutory interpretation support the majority view that the
constitutional avoidance canon should trump Chevron deference.100
Finally, regarding preemption of state law, fewer than half (46 percent)
agreed that Congress intends to delegate preemption questions by
ambiguity.101 This substantial but not overwhelming response is similar to
the divide in the scholarly debate and may be due in part to the Supreme
Court‘s failure to date to provide more clarity.102 Similarly, roughly half
(47 percent) indicated that they use the presumption against preemption
when interpreting statutes.103 These findings cast some doubt on the
efficacy of Chevmore codification in the preemption context. If over half of
the rule drafters surveyed already do not assume Chevron deference applies
to agency preemption decisions—and, indeed, half apply the presumption
against preemption when there is an ambiguity—then congressional
modification from Chevron space to Skidmore weight would have no effect
on agency statutory interpretation at least with respect to those rule drafters.
(Such Skidmore codification may, of course, still have an effect on judicial
behavior.)
* * *
In sum, the vast majority of agency rule drafters surveyed knew of
Chevron and Skidmore and indicated that the doctrines played a role in their
rule-drafting decisions; they similarly understood the Mead principles for
delegation. Many also understood the major questions doctrine but had
conflicting views on whether other types of ambiguities signal
congressional delegation and thus trigger Chevron deference. If the rule
drafters surveyed are representative of the regulatory state generally, then
the bureaucrats clearly listen to the courts. And these findings strongly
suggest that three decades of Chevron and its accompanying evolution have
permeated statutory interpretation inside the regulatory state.
III. LOOKING FORWARD: THE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL OR LEGISLATIVE
MODIFICATION OF THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES
That the rule drafters know these deference doctrines and that these
doctrines play a role in their rule-drafting decisions only get us halfway to
the empirical foundation for the deference lottery and Chevmore
codification theories. This part presents the findings as to the second half
about how these doctrines may affect agency interpretive practices—i.e.,
whether the rule drafters think about judicial review standards when
100. See Walker, Brand X Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 19, at 159–61; see also
Mashaw, supra note 4, at 508 (noting that ―administrators who fail to pursue implementation
any time a constitutional issue looms on their horizon could not possibly carry out their
legislative mandates effectively‖).
101. Q15(g) (n=111).
102. See Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 1004 & nn.396–97.
103. Q25(a), (c)–(d) (n=99).
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drafting rules and interpret a statute differently based on which deference
standard applies. This part concludes by looking at other factors that also
could influence the effect of judicial or legislative modification of the
deference doctrines.
A. The Effect of Judicial Review Standards
To attempt to test these two empirical assumptions for the deference
lottery and Chevmore codification theories, the survey asked whether the
rule drafters agreed with seven statements concerning their drafting
practices and subsequent judicial review. Figure 3 presents the findings for
those questions,104 which can be grouped into four sets of observations.

First, nearly nine in ten rule drafters strongly agreed (46 percent) or
agreed (41 percent)—and another 11 percent somewhat agreed—that
―[w]hen drafting rules and interpreting statutes, agency drafters such as
yourself think about subsequent judicial review.‖105 This broad agreement
is consistent with their responses as to the use of the deference doctrines
discussed in Part II and is obviously a prerequisite for the deference lottery
and Chevmore codification theories. That said, when asked if ―[a]gency
expectations about which level of deference (Chevron, Skidmore, no
deference, etc.) courts will apply to its statutory interpretation affect the
agency‘s drafting process,‖ only about half strongly agreed (10 percent) or
agreed (36 percent), with another third (35 percent) who somewhat

104. Q20(a) (n=106) (nk=0), (b) (n=100) (nk=7), (c) (n=98) (nk=9), (d) (n=93) (nk=14),
(e) (n=86) (nk=21), (f) (n=72) (nk=35), (g) (n=85) (nk=22). A varying number of rule
drafters indicated that they did not know for particular statements, as reported in the ―no
knowledge‖ (nk) number. Accordingly, the number of respondents considered and
percentage calculations in Figure 3 do not include those responses.
105. Q20(a) (n=106) (nk=0).
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agreed.106 In all events, without knowing how judicial review affects their
drafting, this does not tell us too much.
Second, only about three in ten strongly agreed (3 percent) or agreed (25
percent) that ―[t]he level of deference (Chevron, Skidmore, no deference,
etc.) that courts apply to a particular agency statutory interpretation is
reasonably predictable;‖ and half (49 percent) somewhat agreed.107 In
other words, at least among the rule drafters surveyed, these findings cast
some doubt—though perhaps not much doubt, as nearly half (49 percent) of
rule drafters only agreed ―somewhat‖ and roughly another fourth strongly
disagreed (4 percent) or disagreed (19 percent)—on whether there is
reasonable uncertainty as would be required at the first stage of the
deference lottery. The City of Arlington Court‘s clarifying opinion may
have reduced the level of uncertainty, especially for this particular
population (rule drafters) of agency officials. Moreover, reasonable
uncertainty has nothing to do with Chevmore codification or judicial
modification at the second stage of the deference lottery.
Third, about four in five strongly agreed (38 percent) or agreed (45
percent)—and another 17 percent somewhat agreed—that ―[i]f Chevron
deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference) applies to an
agency‘s interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers, the agency is
more likely to prevail in court.‖108 Relatedly, when asked the same thing
about Skidmore deference versus no deference, only one third strongly
agreed (3 percent) or agreed (29 percent) with another 38 percent who
somewhat agreed.109 In other words, the rule drafters surveyed provided
strong support for the critical assumption of the deference lottery and
Chevmore codification theories that agencies know that the likelihood of
success in court is greater if Chevron applies.
Fourth, two questions attempted, perhaps unartfully, to test the final
empirical foundation necessary for either theory—that federal agencies are
more aggressive in their interpretive efforts if they know Chevron deference
will apply. The results were roughly the same whether the question was
posed as being more aggressive if Chevron applies or less aggressive if
Chevron does not:


―If the agency knows or strongly believes that Chevron deference
(as opposed to Skidmore deference or no deference) will apply to
a particular agency interpretation, the agency will be more
willing to advance a more aggressive interpretation.‖: about two
in five strongly agreed (10 percent) or agreed (33 percent), and
another 40 percent somewhat agreed;110 and

106. Q20(c) (n=98) (nk=9).
107. Q20(b) (n=100) (nk=7).
108. Q20(d) (n=93) (nk=14).
109. Q20(d) (n=72) (nk=35). This number does not reflect the fact that thirty-five of the
107 respondents (33 percent) to this question indicated they did not know the answer
compared to only fourteen (13 percent) for the Chevron question. Cf. Q19(d) (n=93)
(nk=14).
110. Q20(e) (n=86) (nk=21).
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―If the agency knows or strongly believes that Chevron deference
will not apply to a particular agency interpretation, the agency
will be less willing to advance a more aggressive interpretation.‖:
about two in five strongly agreed (7 percent) or agreed (31
percent), and another 45 percent somewhat agreed.111

Although not as overwhelming as many of the other findings, this two-infive bottom line (38 to 43 percent)—which becomes an even more
impressive four-in-five number (82 to 83 percent) if those who ―somewhat
agreed‖ are included—provides some support for the empirical assumption
that federal agencies draft differently when they know Chevron deference
applies. In other words, if Congress or the courts were to strip Chevron
deference from a particular statutory interpretation, a fair number of the rule
drafters surveyed seemed to agree that their agencies would be less
aggressive in their interpretive practices.
There are, of course, a number of factors that caution against too much
enthusiasm. For instance, neither formulation of the question garnered a
majority of ―strongly agree‖ or ―agree‖ votes, with ―agree somewhat‖ being
the predominant answer. Similarly, these numbers do not take into account
the substantial number of rule drafters who indicated that they did not know
the answer—21 of the 107 total respondents (20 percent) for the first
question and 22 of the 107 total respondents (21 percent) for the second.
These cautions are in addition to those methodological limitations
addressed in Part I.B in that the numbers are reported purely descriptively
without attempting to generalize beyond the rule drafters surveyed.
Moreover, some of the comments rule drafters volunteered further
suggest caution. For instance, one rule drafter remarked: ―I think
policymakers choose the policy that they believe is best, without being very
influenced by the likelihood of prevailing in court, partly taking into
account other factors, like likelihood of challenge.‖112 Another similarly
noted that ―[l]egal risk is considered by decision-makers, but the policy
outcomes generally outweigh the legal risks, particularly any legal niceties
related to Chevron v. Skidmore deference.‖113 In other words, the judicial
deference standard is just one of many factors that affect agency statutory
interpretation, and it may be a pretty insignificant factor in the large
scheme. And a couple rule drafters indicated that they had never personally
taken into account or observed others taking into account the type of
deference the agency expected to receive.114
On the other hand, for at least two reasons these numbers may
underrepresent the influence of such modification of agency statutory
111. Q20(g) (n=85) (nk=22).
112. Q20, cmt. 4.
113. Q20, cmt. 5.
114. Q20, cmt. 9 (―My experience involves no case where the agency calibrated its
interpretation of a statute according to the type of deference it expected to receive, e.g.,
Chevron v. Skidmore.‖); Q20, cmt. 10 (―In the time I‘ve been writing regulations, no one has
ever specifically discussed Chevron or Skidmore deference in my hearing. So as far as I see,
it‘s not that relevant.‖).
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interpretation. First, because all respondents were career civil servants (as
opposed to political appointees), they may not have wanted to confess to
being more ―aggressive‖ in statutory interpretation based on whether they
thought they would prevail in subsequent litigation—reflecting self- or
other-deception social desirability bias.115 The survey was designed to
mitigate the effect of such biases. As for other-deception, the survey was
anonymous and administered online outside the presence of a supervisor or
peers. As for self-deception, the questions discussed in Part III were asked
as to what federal agency rule drafters generally would do, not what the
respondent personally would do. Similarly, as discussed, this particular
question was asked in two ways—i.e., whether a federal agency would be
less willing or more willing to advance an aggressive interpretation based
on whether Chevron applies. Although the survey design may mitigate
some social desirability bias, it likely does not eliminate it, thus suggesting
that the respondents may have understated the effect Chevron deference has
on agency interpretive practices.
Second, these questions on interpretive aggressiveness may be above the
respondents‘ pay grade. Perhaps that type of policymaking activity is
reserved for the political appointees who were not surveyed. Again,
however, the questions asked whether federal agencies—not the
respondents personally—would be less or more aggressive, and, as
discussed in Part II.B, the rule drafters surveyed have many years of
extensive experience inside the regulatory state. Civil servants may not be
privy to all decision making at their agencies, but surely they likely are
aware of some of it with respect to interpretive efforts. In other words, it
may be a conservative understatement in reporting that two in five agreed or
strongly agreed—and another two in five agreed somewhat—that federal
agencies are more aggressive when Chevron applies.
So where does that leave us with respect to the deference lottery and
Chevmore codification hypothesis that modifying the deference standard
would affect how aggressive an agency may be in statutory interpretation?
The study‘s findings provide strong support that agency rule drafters think
about judicial review when drafting statutes and understand Chevron and
Skidmore and how their chances in court are better under Chevron. Many
rule drafters also reported that federal agencies advance more aggressive
statutory interpretations if they know Chevron applies. But broader
generalizations about whether agencies draft more aggressively when they
know Chevron applies probably cannot be drawn from this study, based on
the responses given and the methodological limitations inherent in the
study. Notwithstanding, the findings uncovered should encourage deeper
empirical inquiry.

115. For further discussion on social desirability bias, see supra note 68; Nederhof, supra
note 68; Sackeim & Gur, supra note 68.
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B. The Effect of Repeated-Game Factors
Regarding the potential effect of judicial or legislative modification of
the deference standards, one of the comments a rule drafter volunteered
merits mention: ―Whether Chevron deference will apply is only one of
many factors that goes into an Agency‘s decision to take a more aggressive
stance.‖116 Indeed, as the author has more fully explored elsewhere, the
predictive effect of modifying the deference lottery may be frustrated by the
fact that ―agencies in the modern administrative state do not face a win-orgo-home contest when playing the lottery. Instead, it is a repeated game—
indeed, a dialogue between courts and agencies—where agencies have
multiple opportunities to play again (and win).‖117 For similar reasons, the
repeated nature of this game may also mitigate the effect of Chevmore
codification.
Accordingly, the rule drafters were asked about three additional doctrines
that allow agencies to replay the lottery in the event that they lose the first
time:





Brand X (a prior judicial interpretation does not always trump an
agency‘s subsequent and different interpretation of an ambiguous
statute);118
Ventura Ordinary Remand Rule (when a court finds an agency‘s
decision is incorrect, absent exceptional circumstances, the
matter should be remanded to the agency for further
proceedings);119 and
Governmental Inter-Circuit Nonacquiescence (a ruling by one
circuit does not force the agency to abandon its interpretation in
other circuits).120

Figure 4 presents the findings from these questions.121

116. Q20, cmt. 1.
117. Walker, supra note 10, at 74 (footnote omitted).
118. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005). The author explores the implications of Brand X on the role of constitutional
avoidance under Chevron in Walker, Brand X Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 19, at
156–82.
119. INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam) (describing it as ―the
law‘s ordinary remand requirement‖). The author traces the evolution of administrative
law‘s ordinary remand rule in Part I of Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 19.
120. See Walker, supra note 10, at 85–87 (reviewing literature and discussing this
doctrine in context of deference lottery).
121. Q22(a)–(c) (n=99); Q23(a)–(c) (n=99).
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With respect to these repeated-game factors, about one in four
(24 percent) rule drafters indicated they did not know any of them, and
nearly three in five (57 percent) indicated none plays a role in their drafting
decisions. Governmental inter-circuit nonacquiescence was the most
known at 57 percent, followed by the remand rule at 45 percent and Brand
X at 43 percent. By contrast, the doctrine that played a role among most
rule drafters was Brand X at 29 percent, followed by nonacquiescence at 25
percent and the remand rule at 21 percent.122 In sum, these findings do not
seem to provide particularly compelling evidence to undermine the effect
that deference standard modification may have on agency interpretive
practices—at least at the agency rule-drafting level.
But these repeated-game factors are not just implicated at the drafting
stage. When defending agency interpretations, government litigators
undoubtedly know and use these principles. That was at least this author‘s
experience while working on the Civil Appellate Staff at the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), which defends federal agencies and their
statutory interpretations in a variety of contexts.123 Thus, if these doctrines
are successfully implemented to save an agency statutory interpretation, the
predictive effect of modifying the deference standard would be
undermined—regardless whether the agency rule drafters also knew about
and used these doctrines when drafting. This point may be reinforced by
122. When asked if they agreed with the Brand X principle (without referring to Brand X
by name), a strong majority agreed (39 percent) or strongly agreed (25 percent), and another
10 percent agreed somewhat. But one in about four disagreed (21 percent) or strongly
disagreed (5 percent). Q16(c) (n=102). One rule drafter commented that whether an agency
may choose a different construction ―depends on the circumstances. A court‘s interpretation
could make it difficult to have a different interpretation.‖ Q16, cmt. 2.
123. For a helpful description of the DOJ‘s appellate staffs, see Al Daniel, The Role of
DOJ’s Appellate Staffs in the Supreme Court and in the Courts of Appeals, SCOTUSBLOG
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/12/the-role-of-dojs-appellate-staffs-inthe-supreme-court-and-in-the-courts-of-appeals/.
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the fact that agency rule drafters and litigators are often not closely
connected. One rule drafter observed:
[M]ost rule drafters and attorneys that practice admin law in government
do not handle the litigation associated with rules. I think that is kicked to
DOJ, so I definitely think there is a big disconnect between drafters and
litigators/those who are defending the rule in court. We often don‘t talk
to each other until the rule is challenged. There is a lot we can learn from
the litigators, ways we can be more proactive in rulemaking rather than
defensive after the fac[t].124

Accordingly, to fully understand how the repeated-game nature of agency
statutory interpretation may temper the effect of judicial or legislative
modification of the deference standards, much more empirical investigation
needs to be done. And these are just three of the many factors other than
the deference standard that could affect how aggressive agencies are in their
interpretive efforts.
CONCLUSION
After thirty years of Chevron, we finally have at least a partial view of its
effect inside the regulatory state. The findings uncovered in this study
arguably confirm common intuition: similar to how Chevron has become
one of the most well-known interpretive tools used by courts, litigants, and
even congressional drafters,125 the agency rule drafters surveyed indicated
that Chevron is the most known and most reported as playing a role in their
rule-drafting decisions of all twenty-two interpretive tools included in the
empirical study. And Mead and Skidmore are not too far behind.
Moreover, the rule drafters provided some support for the intuition that
federal agencies are more aggressive in their interpretive practices if they
know Chevron applies.
But this Essay also underscores how much more work needs to be done
to understand how the deference standards affect agency statutory
interpretation and, in particular, whether federal agencies are more
aggressive in their interpretive efforts if they know Chevron applies.
Fortunately, with the advent of Chevmore codification, empirically
assessing Chevron‘s effect on agency statutory interpretation should
become somewhat easier. Instead of surveying agency rule drafters about
their perceived practices and hoping their answers are not too distorted by
self- or other-deception biases, we may now have a natural experiment
between those areas where Congress expressly says Chevron does not apply
(e.g., OCC preemption) and those where Chevron clearly still does.
This is not just an academic exercise. After all, Chevron and related
doctrines attempt to strike a proper separation of powers balance between
the branches of government by patrolling the delegation of authority from
the principal (Congress) to its unelected agents in the regulatory state.
124. Q20, cmt. 5.
125. Gluck & Bressman, Part I, supra note 8, at 928 fig.2 (listing Chevron deference as
the interpretive tool reported as most used by the congressional drafters surveyed).
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Whether the deference standards help to faithfully control lawmaking by
regulation goes to the democratic (and perhaps constitutional) legitimacy of
the modern administrative state.126 Hopefully it will not take another thirty
years to have an even richer understanding of agency statutory
interpretation.

126. This legitimacy point is explored in greater detail in Walker, Inside Agency
Interpretation, supra note 7; see also Bressman & Gluck, Part II, supra note 8, at 801
(concluding that ―[i]f the democratic legitimacy of courts rests on at least a partial dialogue
with Congress, then we need more study not only of Congress, but also of agencies and
lobbyists‘ interpretive practices‖); Mashaw, supra note 4, at 537 (―Inquiry into the empirical
realities of agency interpretive practice can provide . . . an essential step in the assessment of
the legitimacy of administrative governance.‖).

